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a life insurance policy on the life of a parent which are paid to a child
are free from the claims of creditors. In Mathews v.Bertsch9 a plaintiff
sought to escape this result by attempting to have a trust impressed on
the funds under the following circumstances: plaintiff had provided advances and expenses for decedent and to provide payment decedent had
named plaintiff beneficiary under the policy but had reserved the right to
change the beneficiary. Later, decedent made his daughter 'beneficiary.
The court held that plaintiff was a "creditor" within the meaning of the
statute and not the beneficiary of a constructive trust.
EDGAR I. KING

LABOR LAW
The Ohio courts seem to have been busier with this subject during
the past year than any of the other states included in the Northeastern
Reporter.
The most popular question again this year concerned the limitations
on peaceful picketing.
In reliance upon the decision of the Ohio Supreme Court in Chucales
v. Royalty,' reported in last year's Survey,' the Common Pleas Court of
Hamilton County held in Faust v Truck Drwvers, Local 1003 that where
the owner of a small sandwich shop decided to remove the cigarette
machine belonging to a wholesale dealer and serviced by such dealer's
union employees, and then obtained his own machine and purchased the
cigarettes from local dealers who used non-union delivery men, picketing of the sandwich shop 'by the union to which the wholesaler's employees belonged to coerce the owner to resume his original arrangement,
was unlawful because it constituted either an attempt to exercise indirect
pressure on local concerns and, therefore, amounted to a secondary boycott, or was an unlawful interference with the constitutional right of the
shop owner to buy merchandise where he chose.
In Cavett v.Dystrzct Lodge 34, Internatonal Ass'n of Machinzsts,4
the Hamilton County Court of Appeals permanently enjoined picketing
by a union which had sought 'by this means to force recognition by the
employer even after the National Labor Relations Board had determined
that the union had no authority to act as the 'bargaining agent of the
employees. The court held that no actual labor dispute existed and that
picketing under such circumstances was an invasion of the right of the individual employees not to participate in union activity, and of the em158 Ohio Op. 281, 132 N.E.2a 770 (Ct. App. 1955)
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ployer's right to operate his business without wrongful interference, all
of which was in violation of the public policy of the State of Ohio. Until
Congress has completely ousted the state courts from jurisdiction in matters of this nature, the court said, they continue to have the power to
protect the employer from irreparable loss for which no other remedy at
law exists, particularly after submission of the parties to the National
Labor Relations Board.
The question of the states jurisdiction and the extent to which the
decision in Crosby v. Rath5 may be applied, may soon be settled by the
United States Supreme Court as a result of the decision in Fazrlawn
Meats, Inc., v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters.6 In that case, the union had
18 members out of a total of 50 employees and sought recognition by the
employer as bargaining agent. The court of appeals held that where the
picketing of the business establishment was conducted by a minority of
the employees thereof for organization purposes only, and not to secure
a settlement of grievances among the employees, and where such picketing, although peaceful, is done in part at least upon land owned or leased
by the employer, and the union, by threats and coercion, institutes a secondary boycott against the employer, such picketing is contrary to law and
may be enjoined. In the course of its opinion, the court also determined
that the business of the employer was purely local in character, the "jurisdictional yardstick" of the National Labor Relations Board to the contrary notwithstanding
As a basis for its ruling, the court of appeals
cited Crosby v. Rath and Wi E. Anderson Sons Co. v.Local 3119 despite
the fact that the picketing was not entirely peaceful in those two cases.
The appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio was dismissed and certiorari has
been granted by the United States Supreme Court."°
In InternattonalAss'n of Machinists v. General Electric," the union
brought an action against the employer to enjoin the discharge of certain
employees on the ground that the actAon which the employer sought to
1164 Olo St. 214, 129 N.E.2d 823 (1955).
21955 Survey, 7 WEsT. REs. L. REv. 295 (1956).
136 N.E.2d 169 (Ohio C.P. 1956).
'136 N.E.2d 276 (Ohio App. 1956).
1136 Ohio St. 352, 25 N.E.2d 934 (1940).
'99 Ohio App. 517, 135 N.E.2d 689 (1955).
'The employer in this instance operated a wholesale and retail meat business with
three stores in the city of Akron.
8
Crosby v. Rath, 136 Ohio St. 352, 25 N.E.2d 934 (1940).
'156 Ohio St. 541, 104 N. E.2d 22 (1952).
'-351 U.S. 922 (1956).

11136 N.E.2d 167 (Ohio C.P. 1949).
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take violated the collective bargaining agreement between the union and
employer. The Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court held that where
the collective bargaining agreement provided that the continuous service
of any employee should be terminated by the employer only in the event
that such employee left voluntarily or was discharged, the doctrine of
expresso unus est exclusto altertus applied and termination by the employer except as specified therein was prohibited. The employer, therefore, could not unilaterally terminate the employment of male employees
upon reaching age 65, or female employees at age 60, without any showing of good cause therefor. The reference to a discharge pre-supposed
good cause, the court said, and "retirement" is a voluntary rather than an
involuntary act. This decision should be of considerable interest to those
concerned with retirement plans and the drafting of the separation provisions of collective bargaining agreements.
A so-called class action in the Cleveland Municipal Court was properly dismissed, according to the Ohio Supreme Court, where the one who
initiated the action to recover damages for himself and others similarly
situated as a result of the employer's failure to pay a 10% retroactive
wage increase, had neither the capacity nor the right to maintain the
12

action.

In Moore v. Dstrnct 50, United Mine Workers,13 the action was
against a labor union and certain of its members for alleged conspiracy.
The Common Pleas Court of Franklin County held that since the gist of
the action was assault and battery, the allegations as to conspiracy being
merely matters of inducement, the statute of limitation as to the assault
4
and battery would govern and the action was barred after one year.'
In Stei~son v. Cummns,15 the action was by a former employee for
an award of severance pay allegedly due under a collective barganing
"Young v. Klausner Cooperage Co., 164 Ohio St. 489, 132 N.E.2d 206 (1956)
The plaintiff had walked out on strike in violation of a "no strike" clause in the
union contract, and had failed to return, and this action, the court held, operated as
a forfeiture of his right to any additional pay to which he might otherwise have
been entitled. In addition to holding that where the action fails as to the one initiating the same, it fails as to all, the court also pointed out that no two defendants were
entitled to identical amounts as retroactive pay and could not be joined for this
reason.
13131 N.E.2d 462 (Ohio C.P 1954)
" The court also held that the members of the union were not subject to either civil
or criminal liability for the acts of the union or its officers unless such members
authorized or participated in the particular acts complained of; and that where the
action is dismissed against all of the individual members made parties defendant,
such action could not be maintained against the union itself under the statute authorizing class action, such statute having no application.
- 131 N.E.2d 863 (Ohio App. 1956).

